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S.M. Connell ‘Parallels Between Tyrant and Philosopher in Plato’s Republic’ 
(forthcoming in Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought). 
Abstract: The Republic presents the characters of the philosopher and the tyrant as similar. 
Strongly focused by indiscriminate erotic motivation, both defy convention and lack familiar 
emotional responses, which make them appear to be mad.  This essay argues that Plato put 
forward these parallels partly in order to defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting the 
young, partly to present a possible way to overthrow the current regime and partly to show 
the ineffectiveness of democracy.  The very best leaders may look like tyrants; it is only 
through proper philosophical education that their true natures can be discerned.  
Keywords: Tyrant, philosopher, erôs, democracy, Alcibiades 
I. Introduction 
Plato’s Republic asks us to frame two extreme personalities – one tyrannical, the other 
philosophical (Rep. 9.580b7-c8).  Socrates’ stated goal in constructing this contrast is to 
prove to Glaucon that the just life is the most rewarding and happiest.  The philosopher is the 
most just man there could be, the tyrannical man the most unjust (8.544a5-6). The finale finds 
the philosopher to be 729 times happier than the tyrant (9.587d9-588a1).
1
 Since philosopher 
and tyrant sit at opposite extremes, one might suppose them to have nothing in common.  
However, when considered more closely, significant parallels emerge. Philosopher and tyrant 
both come to the fruition of their characters only through the intervention of others.  Both, 
strongly focused by a peculiarly indiscriminate erotic motivation, defy convention (one 
                                                          
1
 In Plato’s Republic Book 2 Socrates initially sets out to show that the just man is the happiest and the unjust 
man the most unhappy (361b4-d3), before identifying these with philosophical and tyrannical personalities in 
Book 9.  Not all people with tyrannical personalities end up as tyrants, but all tyrants have tyrannical 
personalities. Thus the tyrant is eventually used as shorthand for the tyrannical person and contrasted with the 
philosopher ruler (who similarly must have a philosophical personality). All texts and translations of Plato’s 
Republic are from Plato, The Republic. Loeb Classical Library, trans. P. Shorey (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1930), 2 vols. References to other Platonic works can be found in Plato: Complete Works, ed. 




meaning of the Greek nomos) and do not form the sorts of personal attachments that others 
do, making them appear to others to be mad (mania).  In this essay I argue that Plato uses 
these parallels for various purposes.  They play a role in providing a defence for Socrates 
against the charge of corrupting the youth, and in particular Alcibiades.  They also promote a 
rechannelling of the powerful impulses people feel toward charismatic tyrannical characters 
away from those individuals and towards philosophers.  The most important purpose of the 
parallel, however, is philosophical.  On the surface it appears that Plato needs to convince his 
contemporaries of the fundamental differences between the two characters in order to defend 
his proposed philosopher rulers from accusations of tyranny.  When we dig deeper, however, 
a further message is that there is no effective method to make this distinction based on 
appearances: the two could be so similar as to be indistinguishable.  Given this, democracy is 
fundamentally flawed; only a good ruler will be able, based on knowledge of her own 
psychology, to take over rule. But in so doing, those without knowledge may see her as a 
tyrant.  And so a key message of the Republic as a whole is secured:  democracy is 
ineffective. The only way to bring about a good polis is through proper philosophical 
education whereby the ability to select the best rulers is attained.     
Plato argues that tyrant and philosopher differ fundamentally on the inside, in terms of 
motivations and values, so that only the latter will benefit the state.  The philosopher is 
concerned about and motivated to better the lives of those he rules over while the tyrant is 
only motivated by self-interest, and more narrowly, by an irrational pursuit of his own 
experiences.
2
 The idea of tyrannical destructiveness is closely associated with the term 
paranomia in the literature at the time, and Plato also uses it of the tyrant’s drives.  Although 
the philosopher also acts contrary to current conventions (nomoi), she is law abiding, i.e. in 
touch with what is really or objectively right and good.  Furthermore, in order to placate 
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 One might protest that philosophers care for the good of the polis not the well-being of individuals within it. 
However, there is plenty of evidence that the concerns of individuals do matter to the philosopher-ruler (Rep. 




Glaucon in particular, the life of the philosopher must be shown to be rewarding, and this is 
based on the idea that only the philosopher gets what she wants, because the objects of her 
desires are real whereas the objects of the tyrant’s desires are illusory.  Since the structure 
and focus of their psyches are similar, it is only by differentiating their objects as real and 
unreal that Socrates can distinguish between them, at the same time establishing that 
philosophers abide by a higher law.  The difference between real and unreal is not available, 
though, to just anyone but only to those with a proper philosophical education. Thus the 
tyrant and philosopher appear similar to almost everyone, making it impossible in a 
democratic setting to defend philosophers – a theme we find throughout Plato’s works. 
 I will begin by detailing the similarities between the tyrant and the philosopher.  This 
will involve a sketch of the account of the tyrant in Rep. 9, along with some historical 
context. I will then find references to the philosophical personality which are scattered 
throughout the work.  Next, I will explain how this sketch serves several different purposes 
before detailing the differences which are only discernible to those with true knowledge. 
II. Plato’s Tyrannical Character 
Socrates comes to describe the tyrannical person in Rep. 9 at the climax of the 
degeneration of types of city and corresponding characters.
3
  This degeneration completes his 
response to Glaucon’s challenge in Rep. 2 to show that the just man lives the best and 
happiest life.  Socrates initially provides a sketch of the just individual in Rep. 4. In the just 
person, the three parts of soul, the reasoning part (logistikon), the spirited part (thumêtikon) 
and the appetitive part (epithumêtikon) are in harmony; each performs the function at which it 
is best and the lower two respect the rule of reason, which acts for the good of the whole 
(436a3-8, 441e2-442d5).  After further elaborating the philosophical character of the just 
person in Rep.5-7, Socrates returns to consider the lesser types of city and person in Rep. 8-9.  
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Due to a chance error in breeding, the ideal polis will degenerate into a timocracy (8.546a2-
d9). Similarly, a genetic fault causes the degeneration of the philosophical person, beginning 
with the disadvantage of happening to have one less good parent (549c2-d1). The soul of the 
mother is corrupted by her concerns with honour and money above intellectual pursuits and, 
presumably because this person takes after their mother, they are swayed by her concerns and 
complaints (Rep.8.549d2-550a2).  The degradation of every personality is due to a change in 
the soul’s constitution.  The three parts are properly ruled by reason in its substantive and 
instrumental aspects, with spirit and the appetites agreeing to this management of the whole 
(Rep. 4.441e2-442d1).  The timocrat’s soul allows spirit to enslave reason, using it in an 
instrumental manner to the end of honour (550b3-5).  The faulty constitution of the oligarch, 
democrat and tyrant are all due to the appetitive portion of the soul gaining sovereignty 
(553c4-9).  They are distinguished by different types of appetitive desire – the oligarch listens 
to the necessary appetites, the democrat includes the unnecessary ones (558d2-559e2) and the 
tyrant is ruled by those unnecessary appetites that are paranomic.
4
   
‘Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites there are some paranomic ones, I think, 
which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled by the laws and the 
better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of’… ‘What 
desires do you mean,’ he said. ‘Those,’ said I, ‘that are awakened in sleep when the rest 
of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage 
part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavours to sally forth 
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 Paranomos is normally translated as ‘lawless’ but the meaning is obscure and the connotations to 
contemporary readers numerous, as I intend to explain. For now I will label these appetites paranomic.  The 
tyrannical character is foreshadowed at several points.  First, he is similar to Thrasymachus’ leader, who as 
shepherd, cares for the sheep only for his own gain (343b1-3). Next, Glaucon’s story of Gyges makes each of us 
question whether we wouldn’t have a tyrannical character if given the chance: 
no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice or stay away from 
other people’s property, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, 
go into people’s houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release from prison anyone he 
wished, and do all the other things that would make him like a god among humans. Rather his actions 
would be in no way different from those of an unjust person… (360b3-c2). 




and satisfy its own character.  You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not 
venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not 
shrink from attempting to have sex with a mother or with anyone else, man, god or brute.  
It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and in a word, falls short 
of no extreme of folly and shamefulness’ (9.571b3-d4). 
In seeking to satisfy his paranomic appetites, the tyrannical person turns to a life of petty 
crime, unable to gain enough resources by conventional means – and is likened to an addict 
or drunkard (573b9-c7). But it is not just the predominance of these appetites which effect the 
transformation. Unlike the other degradations of personality, this one requires external 
agents. Tyrant makers or wizards (magoi) are needed to ‘implant in his soul an overriding 
erotic drive to be a protector of his idle and prodigal appetites’ (572e7-573a2).
5
 This erotic 
urge ‘has madness as its bodyguard’ (573b1-2) which is why ‘erôs has so long been called 
the tyrant of the soul’ (573b8).  Plato’s tyrannical person is driven by passionate desire, erôs, 
becoming an antisocial criminal who has no friends, cannot be trusted, and is tormented by 
fears and regrets (573d2-578b5).  If, by chance, he should become an actual tyrant, his life 
will be even more abhorrent (578b7).  This character is Plato’s creation, but since he is 
labelled tyrannical the discussion must also relate to the idea of a tyrant in the Athenian 
democratic imagination. 
By the time that Plato wrote the Republic, the tyrant is a commonplace in the literary 
and political landscape of Athens, most often as antihero, to be contrasted with the good 
democratic ruler.
6
 The term is used of leaders who came to power not through traditional 
means, such as hereditary monarchy, but were popular with the people for radical reforms 
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 This point is made convincingly by A. Larivée, ‘Eros Tyrannos: Alcibiades as the Model of Tyrant in Book IX 
of the Republic’, International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 6/1 (2012), pp.1-26, p.14. 
6
 See the discussion particularly in V. Wohl, Love Among the Ruins: The Erotics of Democracy in Classical 
Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) and J. McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient 




and upholding the needs and desires of many ordinary citizens.
7
  At least in its initial use, the 
term was not pejorative.  By the time of Aristotle, tyrants are defined as those leaders who 
rule for the sake of their own pleasure and not for the common good.
8
  According to its 
foundation myth, democracy emerged from tyranny, with the tyrannicide of Hipparchus, son 
of the tyrant Peisistratus.
9
  The fact that, for Plato, tyranny comes from democracy (9.562a4-
569c8) curiously reverses the supposed historical trajectory and is a challenge to the idea that 
democracy is good. On the other hand, Plato plays the audience’s hatred for tyranny to his 
advantage, by describing it as the inevitable outcome of democratic ‘freedom’ (eleutheria) 
(Rep. 9.562a4-567e8), a freedom that many Athenians in his audience imagine they enjoy. 
As well as hatred, the tyrant as radical ruler retains a certain attractiveness; in times of 
strife, one powerful personality may be capable of transforming a problematic polis for the 
better.
10
 A character who promises positive change could be charming and ingratiating.   
Although this personality is close to the tyrannical one, to call such of person a ‘tyrant’ 
remains an accusation and a slur. The idea of tyrant as hated but also attractive or adored is 
clearest in the numerous narratives about Alcibiades, the quintessential charismatic politician, 
accused of plotting tyranny. Ancient sources testify that he was the adopted son of the 
successful democratic leader, Pericles. As such he was extremely well connected. He is also 
universally attested to have been charming, tall and very physically attractive.
11
 As a political 
                                                          
7
 P. Ludwig, Eros and Politics: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 152.   
8
 Aristotle makes a detailed contrast between a king (basileiontos) and a tyrant, noting the different regard each 
would have for their citizens, although the main distinction is between inherited rule and the imposition of rule 
by other means. See Aristotle Politics v.10 (All references to Aristotle can be found in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], 2. Vols).  The idea of the selfishness and 
destructiveness of a tyrant carries through to the enlightenment.  Locke, in The Divine Right of Kings, writes that 
‘tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, making use of power not for the good of the ruled but for own 
separate private advantage’. See Ludwig, Eros and Politics, p.152. 
9
 Wohl, Love Among the Ruins, p.4. 
10
 Ibid., pp.151-58, 217, 225-27. 
11
 Plutarch remarks that his beauty ‘flowered in every age and season of his physical development and as a boy, 
a youth, and a man made him adorable and sweet’ Alc. 1.4, Wohl, Love Among the Ruins, p.131. See also Plato 




figure he was alternately loved and hated.
12
  In Athens he advocated the Sicilian Expedition 
but was forced to flee to Sparta where he campaigned against Athens. Having made more 
enemies, he then went to Persia, finally returning to Athens. Eventually, he was condemned 
to death and died in exile.
13
  Also striking are the connections made between Alcibiades’ 
personal character and his political ambition.  For some, accusations of plotting tyranny were 
due to his lifestyle of intemperate luxury.
14
 Furthermore, his pursuit of many unconventional 
sexual relationships with both men and women, laying claim to what was not rightly his, or 
hubris, is also linked to his public actions.
15
   
Plato made use of the specific example of Alcibiades, especially in the ways in which 
tyrannical and philosophical characters overlap.  It is particularly noteworthy that he uses the 
term paranomia to characterise the desires of the tyrannical personality since Alcibiades is 
well known as the most paranomic of all characters.
16
 We can also note that the general 
connection between personal licence and one’s political role is carefully detailed by Socrates 
in Rep.9 (as described above).
17
 Plato’s tyrant is a philosophical fantasy – but ties in with 
what other writers were talking about as characteristics of tyrants.  The tyrant is an 
ambiguous figure at this time; on the one hand bad and hated, as a contrast with a democrat 
and on the other hand attractive as a radical reformer.  Plato is appealing to his audience and 
their background assumptions about the nature of tyrants while also subverting these ideas.  
At some junctures, he implies that when democrats think of someone as a bad tyrant, they 
                                                          
12
 The demos hates him but also ‘loves him…and wants to possess him’, Aristophanes Frogs 1425. See also 
Wohl, Love Among the Ruins, p.126. 
13
 Ibid., chs. III-IV; Plut. Alc. 22.1, 23.1, 39. 
14
 Thucydides 6.15.4: ‘The majority feared the magnitude of his paranomia…thinking he desired tyranny’.   
15
 On tyrannical hubris see Wohl, Love Among the Ruins, pp.138-9, 221-2, 252. Later on Aristotle will include 
sexual hubris as one of the key features of tyranny (Pol. 1310a40-1313a17).  
16
 As Wohl Love Among the Ruins, p.129 explains ‘paranomia is the essence of Alcibiades’ imagined 
biography’.  See for example, Antishenes (fr. 29 Caizzi = Ath. 5.220c), Antiphon fr. 67 Thalheim, Plutarch 
Alcibiades 16.15.4. See also Larivée, ‘Eros Tyrannos’. 
17
 The idea that someone who is not in control of himself should not rule over others is found throughout Plato’s 
works, e.g. Gorgias 491d-e, but also in many of his contemporaries and successors.  See, for example, 
Xenophon’s Hiero and Aeschines’ Against Timarchos.  Cf. J. Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes: The 




may be wrongly labelling a good leader. In this way, the philosophical leader would be good 
for the city despite popular disbelief (e.g. Rep. 7.516e9-517a6).  On the other hand the real 
tyrant can never be good, even when they are appealing, or even particularly in that case. Let 
us now turn to the philosophical person. 
III. The Philosopher 
The character of the philosopher is more difficult to discern, partly because its 
presentation is diffuse.  The philosopher is a lover of truth, driven by an erôs for knowledge 
(Rep. 6.485b1, 490b2, 499b5, 501d2).
18
 This focused erôs does not directly lead them to 
contemplate the beauty of true reality (Rep. 7.517b8-c6). Instead they have to be compelled 
to turn around and then driven by force to ascend the steep track out of the metaphorical cave 
(515c4-e6, 519c4-5).
19
  In Rep. 5-7 their otherworldly concentration means less interest in the 
personal dynamics that characterise a more mundane existence. A lack of private property 
and nuclear family suit this personality.  Furthermore, their knowledge allows them to rule 
absolutely without written laws and without any ambition or desire to rule. Within the context 
of the cave metaphor in particular, these characteristics lead the many to view the person with 




The parallels between philosopher and tyrant include all of the following.   
(1) Both start out with the same strong character and potential for virtue.
21
 
(2) Both are moulded into their leadership position by the concerted effort of others. 
                                                          
18
 This is a point even more strongly expressed in the Symposium and the Phaedrus. 
19
 Philosophers must also be compelled to take charge of the city (7.520a8, e2, 521b7, 539e4, 540b4) and at 
each stage of their further education (e.g. 540a4-8). See R. Barney, ‘Eros and Necessity in the Ascent from the 
Cave’, Ancient Philosophy, 28/2 (2008), pp. 357-72, pp. 359-64. For this reason, R. Weiss, Philosophers in the 
Republic: Plato’s Two Paradigms (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2012) argues that the 
philosophers of Rep. 7 are not real philosophers. 
20
 See D. Scott, ‘Eros, Philosophy, and Tyranny’ in M. Burnyeat and D. Scott (eds.), Maieusis: Essays in 
Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 136-53. 
21
 At Rep. 6.490e2-497a4 while defending philosophy, Socrates explains how philosophical natures come to be 
corrupted. The very best and the very worst supposedly start out in youth with the same propensities and are 
‘drawn to philosophy’ (6.494e1-2). The current state of affairs brings about their total corruption (see 




(3) Both are strongly motivated by indiscriminate erôs – erotic or passionate love. 
(4) Both display behaviours that stand outside current convention (nomos). 
(5) Both lack the usual social responses and do not form personal attachments. 
(6) Because of (3)-(5), both seem strange or disturbed to others. 
Although philosopher and tyrant differ fundamentally, on the surface they will often appear 
very similar, due to these parallels.  One might think that their behaviours would differ 
radically.  The tyrant rapes, kills, beats up his parents – all activities which the philosopher 
does not engage in. However, their behaviours may not seem so different to the uninformed 
observer or one who construes these behaviours in a particularly manner. If philosophers 
must punish those who require it (for the good of the whole) this may look like crimes to 
those who do not understand.  On the other hand, a tyrant, who is actually committing acts 
which benefit only himself, may present them as honourable or hide them from public view. 
Socrates’ insists that ‘the height of injustice is to seem just without being so’ and that when 
considering the most unjust character ‘we must allow him, while committing the greatest 
wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice’ (2.361a1-b1).  
Meanwhile, the ‘imagined counterpart’, the most just person, ‘though doing no wrong…must 
have the repute of the greatest injustice’ (361c5-6).  If the tyrant’s villainy is discovered 
while the philosopher’s virtue remains hidden or the other way around, then their behaviours 
could appear almost identical.  In the triumphant finale where he has separated the 
completely just from the entirely unjust person in Rep. 9, Socrates emphasises again that this 
contrast occurs ‘alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known’ 
(580c6).  Thus, he would not consider it unusual for one to be mistaken for the other. 
Furthermore, it is understandable how their responses to and effect on others are in many 
respects similar (4-6), given the fact that both are motivated by an overbearing erotic drive 




Recent scholarship which touches on the parallels between tyrant and philosopher 
focuses on (3) leading to (6).
22
 Dominic Scott uses the contrast to explain why erôs is 
downgraded in the Rep. (4.439d6) to a position in the lowest part of the soul as opposed to its 
more elevated standing in other dialogues.
23
  I will further develop this narrative by offering 
viable reasons why Plato would present the two characters as parallel.
24
 This then reveals a 
more significant break with the account of erôs elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus.  In the 
Rep., the proper objects of erôs are attainable and so it not the desire itself that is downgraded 
but the drive when it occurs without knowledge of its proper objects. It is this that 
definitively distinguishes philosopher from tyrant and which will be the focus of the next 
Section.  It is also important to explore the other ways in which they are parallel in order to 
more fully understand why Plato so purposefully set these out.  Sections IV-V discuss the 
importance of (3) in showing how interested Plato was in presenting the two characters as 
similar and will then propose some reasons why he might have wished to do so.  Sections VI-
VII will go on to explain how Plato can argue for the two characters being different and in 
doing so will also discuss (1), (2), (4) and (5).    
IV. The Psychic Similarity of Tyrant and Philosopher 
Both tyrant and philosopher are motivated by erôs. The philosopher must have an 
indiscriminate love of all knowledge.
25
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 Scott, ‘Eros, Philosophy, and Tyranny’, p.136: ‘they have one thing in common: both are gripped by an 
obsessive eros’.  
23
 See, for example, Symposium 177d7-8, 198d, Phaedrus 251a7-8, Lysis 204b5-c2, and Charmides 155d4-e2.  
For this problem see also P. Ludwig, ‘Eros in the Republic’ in G. Ferrari (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Plato’s Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 202-31, pp. 202-3, A. Price, Love and 
Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 62-3 and S. Rosen,‘The Role of 
Eros in the Republic’, Review of Metaphysics 18 (1965), pp. 452-75, pp. 454-62. 
24
 Scott, ‘Eros, Philosophy, and Tyranny’, does not does not provide any explanation of why Plato would want 
the philosopher and tyrant to have parallel psychic structures.  
25
 See also Sym. 210d-11d where the student must learn to have erotic passion for all beautiful people, laws and 
institutions.  Philosophical lovers should have no attachments to particular people. See G. Vlastos, ‘The 
Individual as Object of Love in Plato’, in G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 




[T]here is every necessity that he who is by nature enamoured of anything (ton 
erôtikôs tou phusei echonta) should cherish all that is akin and pertaining to the object 
of his love…the true lover of knowledge must, from childhood up, be most of all a 
striver after truth in every form…when in a man the desires incline strongly to any 
one thing they are weakened for other things. It is as if the stream had been diverted 
into another channel (6.485c5-d5) 
The erôs of the tyrant is similarly indiscriminate.  First of all, his motivations come 
principally from the paranomic set of appetites.  When these desires dominate then the person 
‘does not shrink from trying to have sex with a mother…or with anyone else, man, god, or 
beast.  It will commit any foul murder, and there is no food it refuses to eat’ (9.571c9-d2). 
Although paranomic appetites are ‘to be found in us all’ (571b5) it is only in the tyrant that 
they become active motivations resulting in actual behaviour.  The tyrant is also described as 
having a singular appetite (573a1), more focused than the multifarious and bland pursuits of 
the democratic person.
26
  This singular appetite leads him toward the plural set. 
The tyrant’s focus on ‘paranomic’ erotic appetites has perplexed many scholars.
27
  
Despite Glaucon’s interjection that the description is ‘most true’ (9.571d5) this aspect of his 
character is remarkably counterintuitive.  In the above description, appetite for food is 
lumped together with appetite for sex. We can easily imagine why someone would eat any 
food (9.571d2), no matter how immoral or disgusting, due to extreme need. Empirical 
instances such as the desperation of shipwreck or plane crash victims abound.  If it were 
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 The democratic person is described as follows:  
he lives always surrendering rule over himself to which ever desire comes along, as if it were chosen 
by lot. And when that is satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but satisfying 
them all equally…he declares that all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally (8.561b3-7). 
27
 Ludwig, ‘Eros and Politics’, p. 395, notes of the outlaw erôs, ‘it is hard to say what its object is’.  Scott, ‘Eros, 
Philosophy, and Tyranny’, p. 139: ‘it is difficult to spell out precisely what a lawless desire is meant to be, and 
how it differs from a lawful one….[these desires] are inherently destructive of society’. Others posit that they 
‘violate the fundamental requirements of the city’ (S. Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic 
[Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989], p. 205) or ‘subvert the foundations of the polis’ (Larivée, ‘Eros 




possible to have an erotic appetite like this, then this would entail that the agent have an 
appetite for sexual satisfaction singularly indifferent to the object or means by which that 
satisfaction were obtained.
28
 From the Symposium we learn that erôs, even when its objects 
are physical, is not a desire to have sex with anyone or anything, but a response to beauty and 
a desire to possess that beauty (Sym. 204d3-8); this is the case even for the crudest animal 
urges (Sym. 206c2-7). Furthermore, the popular idea of a tyrant motivated by erôs is hardly 
the idea that he will have sex with anyone or anything, whether appealing or not.
29
 Their 
power gives them the ability to have their pick of the most attractive people (e.g. the Sultan’s 
harem).
30
  In the Republic, then, the tyrant is imagined to have a completely indiscriminate 
urge for sexual congress, which is not something normally thought to occur in tyrants or in 
anyone else.
31
 I would like to suggest that this is consequence of Plato’s wish to make this 
psychology in significant ways parallel to that of his philosopher.  The nature of erôs in the 
psyches of these extreme personalities has the same quality of being entirely indiscriminate 
about its chosen set of objects:  for the tyrant, sex objects, and for the philosopher, truths or 
real objects.
32
  The tyrant’s extremely rare type of sexual desire which abhors no sex object, 
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 One can distinguish here between a desire (erôs) for erotic activity and the activity itself.  Admittedly the 
activity can occur without any sexual attraction or desire, but for Plato the sexual desire is what marks these 
appetites as paranomic not the sexual activity. 
29 One may take note of Donald Trump’s defence when accused of sexually assaulting several women, which is 
to repeatedly suggest they were not attractive enough for him. For example of Jessica Leeds, he said, ‘believe 
me, she would not be my first choice. That I can tell you’. <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/trump-
jessica-leeds-accusations-229805>, accessed 16/1/2108. Of another women with a similar complaint, Trump 
said: ‘Look at her…I don’t think so’ (speech at political rally in West Palm Beach, Florida, 14 October 2016). 
On Donald Trump as similar to Plato’s tyrant see especially D. Allen, ‘Donald Trump is a walking, talking 




 Those who would be like Gyges could ‘have sex with whoever he chose to’ (2.360c1-2). In Xenophon’s Hiero 
1, 26, Simonides links sex with tyranny in so far as power makes it ‘possible…to have intercourse with the 
fairest you see.’ 
31
 The ancients knew about rabies and its symptoms, one of which is hyper-sexuality.  See Aristotle HA 8.22. If 
Plato was thinking of the tyrant as pathologically hyper-sexual, this could explain why he is depicted as turning 
into a ‘wolf-like person’ at 8.566a. 
32
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is then as odd as the philosopher’s drive for all knowledge. We might be led to wonder why, 
even at the cost of plausibility, Plato wants these parallels.
33
   
V. A Defence of Socrates and a Gain for Philosophy 
One plausible reason for Plato to create parallels between the two personalities is to 
provide a defence of Socrates against the charge of corrupting youth. Another is to channel 
the attraction the audience and readers of the Republic feel for a charismatic and counter-
conventional political personality from the tyrannical type towards the philosopher.  
In Rep. 6, when beginning to show Adeimantus how it is that philosophers can 
actually be useful to the city, Socrates feels he must provide an explanation for their current 
bad reputation. This leads him to detail the frequent corruption (diaphthoras) of the 
philosophical nature. Oddly, its very own qualities of courage, high-mindedness 
(megaloprepeia), aptness to learning (eumatheia) and possession of a good memory 
(6.490c8-9)
34
 ‘tend to corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from philosophy’ 
(6.491b4-6).  In order to explain this, Socrates employs a metaphor. 
We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or 
animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection 
when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For evil is more opposed 
to the good than to the not-good (6.491d1-5). 
The philosopher ‘sown and planted and grown’ in the wrong environment will become bad 
(491e2-492a5).   
 Since no present government is suitable for philosophy (6.497a8-b1), philosophical 
nature is as ‘a foreign seed sown in an alien soil’ which ‘degenerates into something else’ 
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 Those with true philosophical natures are so disrupted that they swing strongly 
in the other direction – becoming vicious in an ostentatious manner (490e2-494a3, 495a8-c5, 
497b1-9). Thus, ‘great crimes and pure wickedness’ come from a strong nature that has been 
ruined. The corrupting conditions mentioned here include being wealthy, physical strong, 
well connected (6.491c1-3) and applauded and praised by the multitude (492b6-c8).  Within 
the corrupt city, the pleasures and desires of the multitude will influence this person.  
Even as a boy among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the 
nature of his body matches the soul... His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will 
desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs (6.494b2-
9).   
These associates will flatter and faun on such a person, resulting in haughty, proud and 
senseless behaviour ‘especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and 
well-born… handsome and tall’ (494c3-5).  This rather elaborate story of the potential young 
philosopher who goes wrong is designed to remind us of Alcibiades.
36
 We will also 
simultaneously recall that Socrates’ conviction on the charge of corrupting the youth relates 
most strongly to his friendship with Alcibiades.
37
  Plato’s own narrative has it that Alcibiades 
is a failure as a student of philosophy and is in thrall to his lowest appetites.
38
   
If both Socrates and Alcibiades begin life with the same capacity to become philosophers 
– they have a good memory, a propensity for learning and a greatness of soul ˗ why is it that 
Socrates becomes a philosopher and Alcibiades turns to evil ways, perhaps even ending up 
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with the tyrannical personality detailed in Republic 9?  The idea of the good seed gone rotten 
allows Plato to lay the blame on the growing conditions and not on the seed or the farmer.
39
 
The outcome was down to luck.  If Socrates had had the bad luck to have been the handsome 
adopted son of the ruler of Athens, then rather than spending his time in detached reflection, 
he would have faced the expectations and ambitions of his friends.
40
  This means that 
Alcibiades cannot be wholly blamed for turning out as he did; rather, he is like the passive 
plant affected by the wrong soil.  The affection, and even love, that Socrates feels for 
Alcibiades is thereby justified.
41
  This love can even be channelled for the good.  The 
attractiveness of this clever, charming, controversial leader gives us some hope that 
philosophy will eventually come to dominate politics.   
The thought that a philosophical personality can lurk inside a tyrannical one can be 
viewed as a positive point. According to Rep. 8-9 aristocracy inevitably declines into 
timocracy, then oligarchy, democracy and eventually tyranny.  The scheme implies a circular 
rather than a linear structure, as Aristotle aptly points out.  
[Plato] never says whether tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what 
is the cause of them, or into what form it changes… [A]ccording to him it should 
revert to the first and best, and then there would be a complete cycle (Pol. 1316a25-
29). 
The only way to go from tyranny is back to aristocracy and the kingly rule of philosophers.  
In order for Kallipolis to happen, a king will have to become a philosopher or a philosopher a 
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 These conversions are extremely unlikely and if either did 
come about, the resultant rulers would not have acted like the Greek ideal of a king.
43
  
First of all, there is hardly any chance that whoever happens to inherit rule as king 
would also have a philosophical character, since this is very rare (6.491a3-4).  Furthermore, 
even if he did, a king will already be fully grown and would not have had the right education 
to develop into a philosopher; and finally, suppose he did become a philosopher, then he 
would have no desire to rule and so would pass over his hereditary right to some other family 
member. This leaves the second option that a philosopher should become a king – but this 
would not really be possible either, since a king has a hereditary right to rule – thus, the 
philosopher will actually need to either overthrow a current regime or convince the majority 
that this is in their best interests and be democratically elected.  Socrates does not concentrate 
(and will think that he cannot as I will explain) on convincing the current population but 
instead recommends something more like the former strategy. 
They’ll send everyone in the city who is over ten years old into the country.  Then 
they’ll take possession of the children, who are now free from the ethos of their 
parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws, which are the ones we’ve 
described.  This is the quickest and easiest way for the city and constitution we’ve 
discussed to be established, become happy, and bring most benefit to the people 
among whom it’s established (7.540e3-541a5). 
A philosopher who becomes a ‘king’ and then goes to such extremes will appear to be 
tyrannical.  And Plato may well be aware of this; in indicating that only by ‘some fate or 
chance’ would a philosopher end up as ruler, he evokes the language of tyrannical 
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 Although Plato prefers to refer to the most just man in the Republic as a ‘king’ 
(basileos), it is unclear he is entitled to do so. The parallel between tyrant and philosopher 
thus helps Plato to explain why philosophers may look like tyrants from the outside. 
Many feel that even though it is possible that some tyrants started off life as potential 
philosophers, due to the irreversibility of corruption, it is impossible to make a tyrannical 
man into a philosophical one.
45
  However, one may cite Plato’s analysis of the psyche of the 
tyrant in support of an alternate perspective on the prospect of reform.
46
  The tyrant is 
depicted as tormented. Indeed Socrates’ argument would be compromised if the tyrant were 
not to experience extreme psychic dissonance; he is ‘full of confusion and repentance’ 
(9.577e2).
47
 The tyrant clearly feels the drives of his higher and better self, the rational soul, 
which cares for the whole person. There appears to be a way to touch the tyrant then through 




Thus far, I have urged that the parallels between the philosophical and tyrannical 
personalities serve to help defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting the young, and his 
associate, Alcibiades, in particular.  They also gesture toward the need for extreme measures 
to remake the city through the cooperation of the right sort of tyrant, who may be capable of 
radical self-reform.  This possibility is, however, substantially reduced by current practices in 
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philosophical education.  The conventions of Athenian society require a student of 
philosophy to give it up when they are fully adult as Plato has Glaucon explain. 
[T]hose who turn to philosophy, not merely touching upon it to complete their 
education (pepaideusthai) and dropping it while still young, but lingering too long in 
the study of it, the majority become cranks, not to say rascals, and those accounted the 




When too young the best natures cannot yet grasp the seriousness of the task at hand but 
instead are ‘infected with paranomia’ and so use dialectic to cleverly argue in favour of 
disreputable pursuits and behaviour (7.538d5-539a2).
50
 Contrary to this corrupting practice, 
Socrates recommends that philosophical techniques not be introduced until at least the age of 
30, and then only to the most able guardians, selected through a rigorous screening process 
(7.537d1-8).  By setting out philosophy as a mature discipline that must be entered into with a 
great deal of care, the Platonic defence of Socrates is somewhat weakened, for he did 
philosophy with Alcibiades and others when they were very young and unprepared. One 
might even see this narrative as a veiled criticism by Plato of his teacher.
51
  On the other 
hand, within a democracy philosophy can only survive if unregulated in this manner – which 
also serves to obscure its potential subversiveness.
52
 As for actual complete transformation of 
the polis along philosophical lines, the most viable option is for the son of a king or leader to 
become a philosopher (6.502a2).  This avoids the suspicion that irreparable damage has 
already been done but seems very tricky insofar as the study of philosophy is itself corrupting 
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if brought in too soon. The daughter of a king or tyrant might be a better prospect.  A female 
child would not be as influenced by expectations and might be left to quietly develop a 
philosophical character.  This could be another reason why it was so important to Plato to 
establish the necessity for female philosopher rulers,
53
 perhaps having heard of successful 
queens of Old Egypt such as Hatchepsut. 
Rejecting the prevailing educative practices, including the lack of proper provision for 
female children, is just one of the many ways in which current conventions must be 
transformed in order to achieve the ideal society.  The philosopher ruler must thereby 
systematically break with convention.  Given this, in continuing to defend Socrates and 
philosophy, Plato must show that the philosopher alone breaks with convention in a manner 
that is beneficial for rather than destructive of society.  Proving that the philosopher is not 
paranomic consists of her having a different and more positive relation to the law (nomos). I 
will first explain (in section VI) why Plato must ultimately emphasise the lawfulness of the 
philosopher and then (in section VII) offer his more thorough defence of this position, 
grounded in psychology. 
VI. Who is Paranomic, Antisocial and/or Psychopathic? 
For Plato the tyrannical person has paranomic desires (9.571b2-8) and paranomic visions 
in dreams (9.572b5-7) and he is drawn to a paranomic lifestyle (9.572b1). Indeed, the tyrant 
himself is, simply put, paranomic (8.539a2).  It is unsurprising that Plato employs this term 
when in fifth and fourth century Athens paranomia is so often used of those who are 
perceived to have or accused of having tyrannical characters.
54
 The focus on the erôs of the 
tyrannical man in Rep. 9 also falls in line with this narrative. Paranomic sexual desires are 
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strongly associated by Plato’s contemporaries with tyrannizing.
55
 Even given this 
background, it is still difficult to discern the proper import and application of paranomia in 
the Republic.
56
  It might indicate the nature of the desires of a person who sets themself 
against the norms and laws. This reading makes paranomia dependent on nomia, representing 
a ‘perverse implantation’.
57
  In this case, the behaviour of the imagined tyrannical man would 
merely serve to reinforce the law, by showing it in relief.
58
 But paranomia need not be mere 
empty rebelliousness; it could point, instead, to something beyond the laws and a challenge to 
their very basis.  On this more interesting view, the tyrant has a strong personality and is not 
afraid of what others will think or what others will try to do to stop him, based on the rules 
that they follow blindly.
59
 On the surface it is not clear that the temperament and lifestyle of 
Plato’s philosopher could not also be viewed as paranomic in this sense.
60
 Consider, for one, 
how unusual the philosopher rulers’ attitude toward legal rules is.  In order to allow for the 
noted reforms, current laws surrounding marriage, incest, adultery, property, etc. will become 
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 Furthermore, philosopher rulers, it is said, will have no need for any written 
laws and will rightly disdain any attachment to legal proceeding (6.427a1-c3).
62
  
The second similarity of philosopher to tyrant is the lack of the usual emotional 
responses and consequent social ties.  Much is made of the tyrant’s disregard for the feelings 
of others, starting with his mistreatment of his parents (9.574b4-c2), which leads to him 
having no true friends (576a2-4). We can also note his sexual impropriety (573d1-2) and his 
tendency to disregard strongly held social mores, such as taboos on incest and bestiality 
(571c2-d2). But now consider whether the philosopher is so very different.  In terms of 
friends, he does not have the sort that we are used to – not possessing nor desiring to possess 
close familial ties or personal affections.
63
  Furthermore, he or she does not form the usual 
attachments in his or her sexual conduct (5.457c8-d2). Indeed, if the potential philosophers of 
the Guardian class are any guide, each philosophical nature must be able to have sexual 
intercourse with whoever he or she is assigned to in the mating ceremony (459e4-460b2), 
which also allows for incest.
64
 More generally, the philosopher’s feelings of compassion will 
appear to be subdued or non-existent.  So, for example, if the philosopher has a child, she will 
not baulk at handing it over, new-born and vulnerable, to an impersonal crèche.  In that place, 
every possible device is put in place so that when she feeds this child with her breasts, she 
will not recognise or bond with it.  If the child is deemed worthy only of a lower class, the 
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philosopher will not feel upset about casting it out. ‘[I]f children are born to them with an 
infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, 
but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out…’ (3.415b7-c1).  
And finally, if the child is judged defective (5.460c2, 461b5) or superfluous (4.423c3), she 
must dispose of it entirely. One might argue that this was not counter-conventional given that 
infanticide was common, however there is evidence of much anxiety and moral 
squeamishness about the practice,
65
 which the philosopher ruler would not share. Although 
exposure of infants not yet welcomed into an oikos might have been acceptable, purposefully 
letting those die who are well established members of the community would surely have been 
frowned upon. And yet this is what Socrates strongly recommends with respect to those 
whose illnesses render them ‘useless’ to the state.  Medical practitioners, Socrates declares, 
‘care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born, but of those who 
are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die’ (3.410a1-2).  A sickly person is 
not allowed to continue to live if he or she cannot be restored to complete function (3.406a2-
407e2) and also might pass on their sickliness to the next generation (407d8). Euthanasia is 
made even easier because the philosopher will not lament death (10.603e7), as others might, 
since she will realise rationally that ‘nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern’ 
(10.604b9-c1, Cf. 6.486a7—b2).  Finally, one might think that the philosopher will lack the 
usual sense of self because she will not care for herself above the good of the whole 
(4.420b2-c2, 7.519e1-520a2) and indeed will not have anything that belongs solely to her and 
will not desire this.
66
  At this point, the comments of a modern ethicist might give us pause: 
‘Does [s]he care for anybody? Is there anybody whose sufferings or distress would affect 
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[her]? If we say “no” to this, it looks as though we have produced a psychopath’.
67
 How, if at 
all, can Plato convince us not to abhor the counter-conventionality of the philosopher, while 
retaining a healthy fear of tyrannical paranomia?  
In recognising such similarities in antisocial tendencies, Scott also sees that ‘we need 
some way of showing that the philosopher is not lawless.’ The solution, he says, is ‘not too 
hard’: ‘the philosopher is asocial, but not anti-social.’
68
 To be paranomic indicates that the 
agent is antisocial, meaning that they destroy social ties.
69
  The philosopher, though, is 
merely asocial. This remedy is not complete, however. Plato’s idea that a city will become 
more unified if family ties are weakened (461e2-462d3) is controversial.
70
 Given this, the 
philosopher’s attitudes and behaviour could be viewed, quite understandably, as similarly 
destructive of fundamental social ties.  This worry is further reinforced and complicated by 
another striking similarity between the two characters, namely a certain shamelessness which 
comes along with transgressing customary norms.   
When Plato first sets out the paranomic desires, for incest and bestiality for example, he 
is aiming to provoke our disgust at the tyrannical person’s shamelessness (9.571d2, 574d2-3). 
Charming Alcibiades, the most tyrannical of characters, is also said to be unusually 
shameless, as only Socrates has ever made him feel the least ashamed (Sym. 216b2).  If we 
look to the Gorgias, Socrates similarly appeals to our outrage at a lack of shame in order to 
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dismiss the character of the tyrannical hero championed by Callicles.  This strong leader, he 
offers, is outside the law (nomos) but in line with nature (phusis). 
As for all those who were either sons of kings to begin with or else naturally competent to 
secure some position of rule for themselves as tyrant and potentates, what in truth could 
be more shameful and worse than self-control and justice for these people who, although 
they are free to enjoy good things without any interference, should bring as master upon 
themselves the law of the many? (Grg. 492b2-8).
71
 
Socrates objects that, rather than finding a higher law in the natural order, this person is to be 
dismissed because of his lack of shame in making his desires as large as possible (492d1-
493d1).  To deem a character’s motivations and behaviour shameful is to appeal to customary 
responses that may not be rational or correct. In his disdain for Callicles’ hero, Socrates 
reduces him to the ‘frightfully miserable’ kinaidos, a passive male, whose role is shameful 
only in the context of Athenian pederastic power relations.
72
 However, in order for the 
philosophers to lead their new lifestyle, they are encouraged not to feel customary shame.
73
 
This is why having naked women in the gymnasium, even though ‘contrary to custom’ (para 
to ethos), is a positive move (5.452a2-c2). Reactions of disgust and shame will be 
inappropriate and the implementation of such practices serve to overcome these reactions in 
the next generation (8.540e6).  Socrates relies, then, on the reactions of disgust and revulsion 
in detailing the behaviour of the tyrannical type while simultaneously encouraging us to 
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overlook such responses to the proposed practices of his guardians.
74
 If the philosophical 
personality really offers a radical alternative to current conventions, then it is hard for him to 
criticise the tyrant on the ground that he contravenes norms which the philosopher no longer 
abides by or believes in.
75
 Plato must explain how it is that paranomia is not equally 
applicable to his imagined philosopher ruler, who could be viewed quite legitimately with 
equivalent fear and trepidation in her disruptiveness. How is it that, with so much in common 
with the paranomic tyrant, motivationally and emotionally, the philosopher can avoid the 
charge of tyranny?   
VII. How Philosopher and Tyrant Differ 
Plato must do some work to show that the philosopher ruler cares for all citizens and 
works for the good of the whole polis, unmotivated by personal gain – whereas the tyrant 
cares only for his own perceived advantage. First of all, it is more usual to regard the 
philosopher as useless (6.487d2) and even as harmful.
76
 Also, even though a tyrant is later on 
defined by his disregard for the welfare of the people, there is no necessary step from the 
original meaning of tyrant to this new one.
77
  After all, the popularity of certain tyrants
78
 
suggests that their leadership was better for the people who preferred them to rule.
79
  
Furthermore, even Plato’s idealised philosopher could be seen to take over power and rule for 
their own advantage, as tyrants are accused of doing.  Plato’s ideal polis will be best for 
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philosophers who will spend most of their time philosophising (7.520d6-7), won’t be 
persecuted and won’t be ruled over by someone worse (1.347c3-4). That the philosopher 
could, in some sense at least, be motivated to make life best for people like herself, also 
makes good sense in the context of the argumentative aims of dialogue as a whole, where 
Glaucon has to be shown that being just pays for the individual (2.367d2-4).
80
 On the surface, 
the method of taking control and the appearance of a self-interested motive is the same in 
philosopher and tyrant.   
 The only way to tell a tyrant from a philosopher is to ‘go down into a person’s 
character and examine it thoroughly,’ rather than being ‘dazzled by the façade’ (9.577a1-3).  
From this process in Rep. 9, we eventually discover the key to the meaning of paranomia and 
why it can only be applied to the tyrant.  The first difference is one of structure and the 
second of content.  Let’s begin with the structural point.  As explained earlier, the tyrant’s 
soul is structurally unsound because the lowest part takes control. The appetitive part breaks 
free from the rest of the soul to ‘sally forth and find a way to satisfy itself’ (571c5).  
Furthermore, in the tyrant these appetites (epithumiai) are paranomic. The philosopher, in 
contrast, possesses the correct structural arrangement in her soul with the rational part 
controlling any paranomic urges (571d3-572b2) which explains how ‘everyone’ has them 
(572b4) although very few act on them.  With appetites in control, the tyrant’s soul is 
conflicted (577d1-578a2); furthermore, his out of control appetites are insatiable (578a1, 
579e1-4).   
 Plato’s opponents could claim that the tyrannical person is not conflicted but is 
pursuing the desires he feels most akin to and which make him happy. For Thrasymachus, for 
example, tyranny is ‘the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who does 
the wrong…most happy’ (1.344a3-4). Gyges would also appear to get what he wants and to 
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be happy (2.359c8-360b1; Cf. 2.362b2-c7). One could also argue that the Alcibiades was not 
merely out of control, but wilfully choosing a powerful alternative to conventional morality. 
Why not posit that the tyrant has a harmonised soul, since erôs focuses his desires and 
integrates them toward one end (or one type of end, i.e. physical erotic activity)?  Plato has 
further arguments concerning the internal psychological state of the tyrant which can be used 
to answer such objections. In particular, he will make a case for the tyrant as addict, and 
thereby not in control and thereby incapable of happiness.   
In order to attempt to draw in the likes of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, 
Socrates must appeal to what they want – and then show them that although it might seem 
desirable to act badly to get what you want, like Gyges, this is psychologically impossible.   
The soul of such a person – destined for great villainy or virtue (6.490a8-494b2) – simply 
cannot be content to do wrong and harm.  Something in their soul will protest - their ‘better’ 
or rational self.  Plato clearly does not think that the tyrannical man is able to self-identify 
with his epithumetic part.  Like an alcoholic (573c1), the tyrant is not purposively and 
wilfully doing what he really wants to do. In effect, what he wants is not what he really wants 
(576e2).  The tyrannical man is actually made to do what he does by parts of his psyche 
which he is unable to control.  Thus, we are reminded of the tripartite psychology and the 
attendant examples of Rep. 4.  Leontius and the thirsty man both attempt to resist the desires 
originating in the lower parts of their soul, suggesting that the focus on control is only in the 
reasoning part (logistikos).  Leontius curses himself because when he looks at the corpses he 
has lost control, driven to do so by a desire with which he does not identify – he is outside 
himself, out of control (4.439e4-440b3). So also, we are to imagine the tyrant not doing what 
he really wants to do, since his real self is only to be identified with the rational part which 




paranomic variety. He does not choose but is driven by a force separate from his true self, as 
in instances of addiction.   
At one point, Socrates tries to ground his case in ontology, presenting the idea that a 
tyrant cannot be happy because the objects of their desire are unreal, as opposed to the real 
objects of philosophy.  This argument occurs towards the end of Rep. 9 running up to the 
conclusion that the tyrannical person is the most unhappy individual and the philosopher the 
happiest, with happiness being here identified with pleasure.  The three parts of soul are first 
associated with three types of life, each of which value a different entity –profit loving, 
honour loving and knowledge loving; tyrants are of the first variety, philosophers of the last. 
Each will consider their life the most pleasant (Rep. 9.7.580d5-581d5).  Rather than treat this 
as subjective preference, Socrates maintains that one of them is correct, i.e. the philosopher, 
who judges rightly due to experience, wisdom and argument. The remainder of Rep. 9 ch.8 
establishes that the philosopher has experience of all three, whereas the others do not. 
However, this does not mean that the others could not experience the utmost pleasure in their 
own minds, only that they do not have the third kind of pleasure.  Thus, Socrates must move 
on to discredit the pleasure that the other two experience, ultimately focusing entirely on the 
lover of profit, who seeks out the objects that satisfy bodily desires.
81
 Rep. 9.9-10.583b1-
586c6 is a two pronged attack on the experience of pleasure and then on the objects that 
effect that experience in the profit lover.  The experience is suspect because it is mistaken 
pleasure – based on the view that pleasure is not subjective, but somehow truth-apt.
82
 The 
second argument (9.10.584d1-586c6) is more relevant to the context of the Republic. Here 
Plato posits that the objects of bodily desire, which he called ‘nutriment’ (585b9), are less 
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real than the objects sought by the intellect, the eternal objects of knowledge. He repeatedly 
claims that these latter objects have more share in truth and reality (585b6-d6). Those focused 
on bodily appetites have never been filled with real things (586a5). The unreal objects (or less 
real) they seek make their desires insatiable (aplêstian) and so they are ever greedy for more 
(pleonexia) (586b2-3).  Transposing this idea of less real or unreal objects back onto the 
mental state of the agent, Plato calls the profit lovers experiences mere ‘phantasms’ (eidôlois) 
and ‘scene-paintings’ (skiagraphêmenais) of true pleasure (586b9).  The idea that there are 
objects with differing degrees of reality links to other discussions in the text.  The tyrant’s 
pleasure is particularly suspect being ‘three phantasms away from reality’ (587c6), this third 
level recalling the shadows of puppets in the cave and anticipating the critique of mimetic art 
in Rep. 9 (602c2).
83
 We are surely meant to see the profit lovers who think that the objects of 
bodily desire are real as like the cave prisoners who think that the shadows of puppets are 
true reality (7.515b9-c2).
84
 Neither life is choice-worthy for the individual. 
That there could be real objects that fix moral knowledge is still a contentious and 
unproven claim. It is possible that there are no objective values and thus nothing to ground 
these claims of the value of philosophers of the type described.  That we talk as if there were 
absolutely right and wrong is no help, since such talk can be in ‘error’.
85
 Plato’s case cannot, 
thereby, rest directly on the claim that only philosophers can access what is real. Instead it 
gets its strength from the view that an extremely immoral agent is psychologically conflicted 
and unhappy.  One might worry that if the tyrant were asked if he was conflicted and 
unhappy, i.e. if he felt ashamed, he would reply ‘not at all’.  It certainly seems in principle 
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possible for someone who, for example, violated another sexually against their will not feel 
any mental conflict. A pragmatic moral sceptic could say that it is only due to the harm 
caused to another that such personalities are frowned upon.  But there are strong intuitions 
about the wrongness of such actions and those whose personalities lead to them, quite apart 
from whether any harm has been done.  Thus, rape is wrong even when the victim is 
unconscious and will never find out what has occurred.
86
 Anyone who did not grasp this fact, 
fails to have a properly constructed human psyche.  This is why we are led to think that as 
long as the tyrannical person maintains some grip on his humanity, and is not entirely bestial, 
he will suffer anguish both in this life (9.587e5, 12.589a1-3) and the next (10.615d3-
616a7).
87
 Within the tyrant is a true self or mind, while at the same time he desires and seeks 
out the wrong objects and ends.  He is thereby at odds with his self, taken in its ‘entirety’ 
(579e2).  The tyrant is mad; he is ‘out of’ his (right) mind.
88
 
The turn toward the internal psychology of philosopher versus tyrant, however, makes 
establishing which is which from an objective point of view pretty impossible.  Since it is 
only from the inside that a person can know herself to be either philosopher or tyrant, it will 
be difficult to trust a radical leader.  Thus, the more assurance there is that it is possible to 
line up reality with goodness, the more persuaded a reader will be of the possibility of a good 
leader, even if absolute proof is unavailable.  And so the Republic must direct its rhetoric in 
this manner.  
The Republic is constructed in part to convince the reader of the superiority and 
usefulness of the philosopher over the tyrant. Although we may not accept that philosophers 
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are in touch with transcendental reality, we can follow Socrates’ case for this in the narrative 
of the text. As Section IV showed, the erôs of philosopher and tyrant are the same in so far as 
erôs is an obsessive drive which seeks its objects indiscriminately, whether that set of objects 
be objects of knowledge or sex objects. The difference between the sorts of objects of erôs 
differentiates the two characters. On the one hand, the objects of tyrannical erôs are 
supposedly unreal
89
 (583e4-587c1), which is why the tyrant is perpetually unfulfilled (578a1-
b2, 579e2-3). The pleasure he feels is also illusory and so cannot truly satisfy him, just as a 
phantasm of a beautiful woman cannot satisfy her lover (9.586c3).  On the other hand, the 




Scott argues that the difference in the objects that obsess tyrant and philosopher mean 
that the philosopher is mad in a good way and the tyrant in a bad way.
90
 He concludes that 
erôs has been downgraded in the Rep., noting the differences between this text and the 
Symposium and Phaedrus.  But the more crucial difference here is not so much the value of 
erôs as the structure of the psyche with relation to the erotic drive. First of all, in order to 
fully support the contrast between tyrannical dissonance as opposed to philosophical 
integrity, the philosopher cannot be mad at all. In the Phaedrus the philosopher is ‘out of her 
mind’ in the sense that she is focused on something better than herself or any other individual 
person, the Good Itself. ‘Standing outside human concerns and coming close to the divine, he 
is considered by the many to be out of his mind, although what they don’t realise is that he is 
divinely possessed’ (Phdr. 249c8-d2). In the Symposium, the psychology of the philosopher 
is conflicted and incomplete.  Just as the tyrant is in a state of perpetual struggle, full of 
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 so also the erôs that a philosopher experiences is 
characterised by lack and frustration (Sym. 202d1-4, 203d1-4).  When experiencing erôs, a 
person does not yet fully possess the good and beautiful things which she desires and which 
will make her ‘happy’ (202c8).  The state of the psyche of the philosopher in the Republic, in 
contrast to these characterisations of lack and frustration, is integrated and stable.  Although 
initially it seemed that both philosopher and tyrant shared similar psychic drives, in fact 
Socrates must emphasise how differently erôs manifests itself in the two, integrating the mind 
of the one while dividing that of the other. The claim that the tyrant never gets what he wants 
implies that, for Plato, erôs in its proper and complete form is directed toward really existent 
objects, and thus the drive is only satisfiable if and when these are attained.   
It is now possible to summarise Socrates’ presentation of the difference between tyrant 
and philosopher. The especially extreme psychological dissonance found in the tyrant is 
caused not only by the dominance of the appetitive portion of the soul but by an erôs cut off 
from its proper objects.  A motivation toward physical sensuality drive the tyrant without 
thought for the whole person away from completeness and satisfaction which can only be 
found in the true, knowable and law-like objects of erôs – the intelligibles 
Erôs is a powerful force for either good or evil. When mistakenly directed towards 
objects that lack reality, it is merely a completely focused extreme passion without law and 
order (9.587a6-9) which causes the agent to disregard all of her usual and customary 
concerns for no good reason. In contrast, the erôs that brings about such detachment is 
beneficial in the philosopher. It ensures a just society by eliminating feelings of 
possessiveness towards others in those in charge.  Those who are born into the wrong class 
are reassigned, cutting out nepotism and ensuring social mobility.  Thus, for example, 
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controlling the size of cities through euthanasia (3.407d4-e2, 410a1-5, 5.460c3-7), is a task 
that the guardians will not find ‘difficult’ but ‘easy, (4.423d8-e3).   
The ideal ruler, as Socrates explains in several places, takes care of what she rules over 
for the good of that thing, be it sheep (1.343a9-b3) or plants (9.589b2-3) or people (1.342d2-
e10, 345d3-e3, 9.590c7-d10). This is the opposite of the pleonexia that characterises the 
tyrant’s motivations - the narrow greed that harms others by depriving them of their due.  As 
Scott notes, the counter-conventionality of the philosopher is beneficial rather than its 
destructive cousin paranomia, because it is fundamentally lawful.
92
  Law or custom, nomos, 
is used to label two phenomena: the contingent laws in place in actual cities and that which is 
lawful in some broader sense.  In the narrow sense philosophers need not bother with the 
laws in cities, such as the petty regulations that prescribe hairstyles (4.425a9-b4).  However, 
they will have supposedly internalised the correct rules that ought to govern all human life.  
Thus, in terms of the higher or correct nomos, the philosopher is law-abiding and, indeed, law 
enforcing.  Possessing knowledge of what is real, which is lawful, philosopher rulers will be 
able to properly judge which customs to retain.  For example, when guardians use the names 
‘father’ or ‘mother’ ‘all their actions conform to the name in all customary observance toward 
fathers and in awe and care and obedience (nomos) for parents’ (5.463d2-4). What defies 
custom is the fact that they will not have a single father and mother but thousands of them 
and this is not unlawful because it is a reform based on understanding ‘true reality’.
93
  The 
tyrant, however, is seen to lack any relation to nomos in the abuse he meets out to his parents 
(9.574a2-c8).   
Despite this argued for difference, in many other instances, the behaviour of tyrant and 
philosopher will seem identical.  So, for example, they may both harm and kill people; only 
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when the philosopher does so, Socrates wants the reader to believe that this will be according 
to a higher law which improves the city, for example in killing someone ‘incurably evil’ 
(4.419a2-3), and harming someone who requires punishment in order for their life to go 
better (9.591a3-b10). The outward appearance of similarity means that it is only from an 
internal perspective that philosopher and tyrant can be differentiated.  Non-philosophers will 
not be able to properly discern the differences.   
By bringing to light such similarities and emphasizing the importance of an internal 
psychological perspective, two key themes in the Republic are brought together – the 
rejection of democracy and the importance of self-knowledge.  Arguably, Plato is aware that 
democratically inclined readers will feel uneasy about anyone putting themselves forward as 
deserving supreme power, no matter what their pedigree.  As Aristotle so astutely put it, 
‘nowadays nobody thinks someone is immeasurably superior to others to be king.’
94
 Despite 
this strong democratic ideology, however, many literary contemporaries were similarly 
critical of the status quo and much longing for a singular superior ruler remained, explaining 
the draw of numerous charismatic political figures.  Even Glaucon or Adeimantus are 
presented as attracted to tyranny believing that a bad regime may have to be replaced 
forcefully by a better one.
95
  On the surface it might seem that Plato is attempting to use this 
unruly attraction to gain support for the philosopher. Ultimately, though, he considers that 
project to be entirely impracticable.  There really is no principled way to tell the difference,
96
 
and so the desire to find a good ruler that the populace can love is to be abandoned. It does 
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not matter whether you think a person is tyrannical or not, they may be the right person to 
rule if they know themselves to be so; the popular vote should play no part in that decision.
97
  
The non-philosophical democrat believes falsely that a tyrant is bad because he is not 
chosen by the people and he could be good if he appealed to the people.  In fact, a real 
tyrant’s badness has nothing to do with popularity – but with inherent destructiveness to 
society. However, someone who appeared to be a tyrant could be good without the people 
thinking or believing this. The parallels between the philosopher and the tyrant and their 
resultant seeming similarity is important because it teaches the reader how unimportant the 
appearances are and thus encourages her to find out about what is actually the case and in 
doing so, pursue philosophy.  And doing philosophy, for Plato has profound political 
ramifications. To do philosophy and to truly be a philosopher, he thinks, one cannot simply 
toy with words and arguments in one’s youth and carry on as usual.  Instead, the pursuit of 
the frenzy for knowledge that best represents the vocation is entirely incongruous with 
maintenance of the status quo.  If, as a result, the philosopher looks like a tyrant, this cannot 
be helped.  In this situation, a person must look inside, know herself and the reality of her 
motivations.  If her motivations are towards what is truly lawful, then she may legitimately 
take charge.  This is why a person must be concerned to ‘keep his [or her] eye fixed on the 
constitution of the soul’ (9.13.591e1-2). Alcibiades did not learn this, Thrasymachus is 
beyond help but Glaucon and Adeimantus must come to understand the uselessness of 
democracy and the politically transformative relevance of self-knowledge. 
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